Trying every day to fight against 'knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing'.
May 8, 2012
Hugh Hendry (Eclectica), end of April 2012 update (pdf)
This is the pdf version of this great investor.
Apr 22, 2012
Some notes about Contango (MCF)
Source: Company's site; E&P 101 - The Short Course - 31/01/2001 - contango.com/investor/events/E_P_101_The%20Short%20Course.ppt
MCF is in the UPSTREAM sector, exloration & production (E&P).
MCF is in the UPSTREAM sector, exloration & production (E&P).
Mar 9, 2012
National Western Life (NWLI)'s investment thesis borrowed from Redfield, Blonsky & Co., LLC
Hi all,
yes it's a lot of time that I don't
post anything for you, beloved readers.
Today I have no 'original' post but
a link to share with you: it is about NWLI, National Western Life http://rbcpa.com/companies/NWLI_Notes.pdf
I found this post from Redfield,
Blonsky & Co., LLC, an advisor I do not know how I came to know them, but
at that time I was looking for St. Joe's investment thesis and from what I
remember it was a very deep analysis.
Why I'm looking for thesis about
NWLI?
Because it's selling at less than
half of book value (the lowest point in 10 year, with an historical average of
0.7 p/book), have (and ever had) 0 debt, and it's an historical holding of
Third Avenue Small Cap.
Here are the numbers about book
value, book value growth, ROE and some averages.
Year
|
Quarter
|
Bvps
|
YoY
Bvps Gr.
|
Roe
1Y
|
2007
|
Q1
|
263.4
|
||
2007
|
Q2
|
265.1
|
||
2007
|
Q3
|
270.6
|
||
2007
|
Q4
|
279.3
|
||
2008
|
Q1
|
283.3
|
7.5%
|
8.2%
|
2008
|
Q2
|
283.9
|
7.1%
|
7.8%
|
2008
|
Q3
|
274.8
|
1.6%
|
5.3%
|
2008
|
Q4
|
272.0
|
-2.6%
|
3.4%
|
2009
|
Q1
|
279.1
|
-1.5%
|
3.4%
|
2009
|
Q2
|
293.2
|
3.3%
|
3.3%
|
2009
|
Q3
|
303.0
|
10.3%
|
4.2%
|
2009
|
Q4
|
307.2
|
13.0%
|
4.3%
|
2010
|
Q1
|
315.7
|
13.1%
|
4.5%
|
2010
|
Q2
|
326.1
|
11.2%
|
4.5%
|
2010
|
Q3
|
334.8
|
10.5%
|
5.7%
|
2010
|
Q4
|
335.8
|
9.3%
|
6.2%
|
2011
|
Q1
|
340.3
|
7.8%
|
6.1%
|
2011
|
Q2
|
345.7
|
6.0%
|
5.3%
|
2011
|
Q3
|
351.4
|
5.0%
|
5.7%
|
Average
|
6.8%
|
5.2%
|
Giuseppe
Feb 11, 2012
Yes, my first position belongs to the '10 times revenue club' ... but is not Facebook
As my beloved readers know well, I have a 'value-soul' but it is not rare to find in my portfolio a good number of 'growthy' stocks, whose valuation are, well, all but cheap.
One of those stock is Intuitive Surgical, Inc. (ISRG) and it is now my first position (less than 15%).
The '10 times revenue club' I mention in the title is a reference (maybe, a tribute) to a great post written by William Gurley, general partner at Benchmark Capital, where he warns of the risk of re-playing the mentality in vogue during the 'dot.com' bubble in the late 90s: "(...) Calculating or qualifying potential valuation using the simplistic and crude tool of a revenue multiple (also known as the price/revenue or price/sales ratio) was quite trendy back during the Internet bubble of the late 1990s. Perhaps it is not peculiar that our good friend the price/revenue ratio is back in vogue. But investors and analysts beware; this is a remarkably dangerous technique, because all revenues are not created equal".
Just to contextualize the numbers, I have listed below the average values (here I have used ev/sales in order to correct the numerator, p, or market cap, for the net cash or debt position of each company) for sectors (GICS) represented in the S&P 500:
But now, before talking about valuation and explain why and if ISRG 'deserve' this kind of valuation, I'll go straight on the recently published 10-K that cover the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, where I'll detail the most important lines in order to understand the business.
One of those stock is Intuitive Surgical, Inc. (ISRG) and it is now my first position (less than 15%).
The '10 times revenue club' I mention in the title is a reference (maybe, a tribute) to a great post written by William Gurley, general partner at Benchmark Capital, where he warns of the risk of re-playing the mentality in vogue during the 'dot.com' bubble in the late 90s: "(...) Calculating or qualifying potential valuation using the simplistic and crude tool of a revenue multiple (also known as the price/revenue or price/sales ratio) was quite trendy back during the Internet bubble of the late 1990s. Perhaps it is not peculiar that our good friend the price/revenue ratio is back in vogue. But investors and analysts beware; this is a remarkably dangerous technique, because all revenues are not created equal".
Just to contextualize the numbers, I have listed below the average values (here I have used ev/sales in order to correct the numerator, p, or market cap, for the net cash or debt position of each company) for sectors (GICS) represented in the S&P 500:
Consumer Discretionary 1.7, Consumer Staples 1.8, Energy 2.9, Financials 5.0, Health Care 2.3, Industrials 1.6, Information Technology 2.7, Materials 1.8, Telecommunication Services 2.3, Utilities 2.2 --> average value S&P 500 = 2.6So, 'our' ISRG, with its 9.7, is a stock with an ev/sales of 9.7, more than 4 times the average of its sector (health care) and one of the most expensive stock in the entire S&P 500.
But now, before talking about valuation and explain why and if ISRG 'deserve' this kind of valuation, I'll go straight on the recently published 10-K that cover the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, where I'll detail the most important lines in order to understand the business.
Feb 6, 2012
Why a Beppaun's blog
As my definitive attempt to be 'up to date', I finally convinced myself to build a blog.
I should have named it Beppaun 2.0 but being the 1.0 version only on my mind, I thought it could be enough to name it Beppaun, as I'm currently known by my friends.
This will be mainly the place where I'll post thoughts about the company I own in my portfolio and it should serve as a notebook where I justify the reason of my investments.
Please, help me to improve this project and ... have a nice experience with the Internet.
I should have named it Beppaun 2.0 but being the 1.0 version only on my mind, I thought it could be enough to name it Beppaun, as I'm currently known by my friends.
This will be mainly the place where I'll post thoughts about the company I own in my portfolio and it should serve as a notebook where I justify the reason of my investments.
Please, help me to improve this project and ... have a nice experience with the Internet.
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